November 29, 2009

Boston Globe

Pakistan continues to harbor Al Qaeda terrorists who would pose an imminent threat to US national security if they were to take control of that country’s nuclear weapons. Obama’s March report advised that our national security requires us to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and prevent their return to either country in the future.’’

To achieve that goal, General Stanley McChrystal suggested a “counterinsurgency’’ strategy, saying that he needs at least 40,000 more US troops in addition to the 68,000 already there. But, he warned: “A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency; the insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution. This is their war’’ and any success must come “by, with, and through the Afghan government.’’

In other words, without a legitimate and credible Afghan partner, that counterinsurgency strategy is fundamentally flawed. The current Afghan government is neither legitimate nor credible. It has recently been installed by nothing more than a fraudulent political default. President Hamid Karzai now knowingly presides over a culture of corruption, an opium-dependent economy and, so far, has shown neither the credibility nor political will to rid his government of its corrupt warlords and crony power brokers, providing slim hope for “an Afghan solution.’’

Further, General James Jones, the president’s national security adviser, says of Afghanistan: “The Al Qaeda presence is very diminished. The maximum estimate is less than 100 operating in the country, no bases, no ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies.’’

So, let’s get our priorities in order. We should not send a single additional dollar in aid or add a single American serviceman or woman to the 68,000 already courageously deployed in Afghanistan until we see a meaningful move by the Karzai regime to root out its corruption, assemble a more representative coalition government, and demonstrate some measure of transparency and accountability under the rule of law.

The brave US and NATO troops currently there should accelerate training of local Afghan Army and police forces to prepare for gradual reduction and ultimate disengagement while our civilian forces help build responsive governance infrastructures at the province level.

Our national security goal has not changed. But to achieve it, we need not enlarge our military footprint in Afghanistan and risk even more violence in retaliation for our perceived “occupation.’’

Instead, we and our NATO allies should narrow our strategy; focus on sealing and securing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to prevent Al Qaeda from fleeing to Afghanistan as we use intelligence, drones, and special forces to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan’’ where the real danger exists; assist Pakistan in enhancing civilian control of a stable constitutional government, in ensuring its economic growth and in securing its nuclear weapons. With this refocused strategy, our NATO allies can do more to assist militarily and should step up with more civilian assistance.

Obama has inherited no good options, but a more focused strategy with no additional troops stands out as preferable to all the others.

Senator Paul G. Kirk Jr. of Massachusetts is a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.